First Lessons from Donald Trump’s Trade Undiplomacy by Velut, Jean-Baptiste
 IdeAs
Idées d'Amériques 
12 | Automne / Hiver 2018
Le tourisme dans les Amériques
First Lessons from Donald Trump’s Trade
Undiplomacy
Jean-Baptiste Velut
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ideas/4147
DOI : 10.4000/ideas.4147
ISSN : 1950-5701
Éditeur
Institut des Amériques
 
Référence électronique
Jean-Baptiste Velut, « First Lessons from Donald Trump’s Trade Undiplomacy », IdeAs [En ligne],
12 | Automne / Hiver 2018, mis en ligne le 06 novembre 2018, consulté le 19 avril 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/ideas/4147  ; DOI : 10.4000/ideas.4147 
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 19 avril 2019.
IdeAs – Idées d’Amériques est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence Creative Commons
Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modiﬁcation 4.0 International.
First Lessons from Donald Trump’s
Trade Undiplomacy
Jean-Baptiste Velut
1 “The return of isolationism”, “the demise of multilateralism”, “the end of globalization”…
these alarmist headlines have dominated analyses of America’s place in the world since
the election of Donald Trump. This applies to the trade policy sphere,  where Donald
Trump’s nationalist and protectionist discourse has strongly departed from the dominant
free trade narrative of his predecessors. Yet, if America’s retreat from multilateral and
regional institutions is clear in many policy spheres – climate action, arms proliferation
or foreign aid – the significance of the current diplomatic revolution is subject to great
speculation in the trade policy sphere. This article analyzes the underlying logic, extent
and  possible  repercussions  of  current  transformations  of  US  trade  diplomacy,  by
assessing this strategy through the lens of the USMCA (U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement)
or NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) negotiations. 
 
The logic of retrenchment
2 While the dramatic decline in trade and investment in the aftermath of the financial
crisis of 2008-2009 raised fears of a sustained period of “deglobalization,” the second
decade of the twenty-first saw the blossoming of a new generation of preferential trade
agreements of  unprecedented geographic and regulatory scope like the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP or TAFTA) and the Transpacific  Partnership
(TPP).  Although  inherently  weakened  by  their  democratic  shortcomings,  these  new
international  economic  regimes  were  deployed  as  an  ambitious  geopolitical  strategy
aimed at shaping global economic governance for the near future. 
3 Today, the contrast between the strategic ambitions of the new generation of “mega”
trade deals designed under the Obama presidency and the “renegotiating agenda” of the
Trump administration with allies and rivals alike could hardly be sharper. Admittedly,
the trade wars between the world’s two largest economies could have potential economic
effects far beyond the conclusion of TTIP or TPP. Yet, despite its economic significance,
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the US economic showdown with China incarnates a transactional approach akin to the
renegotiation of NAFTA or the Korea-US FTA, that is more concerned with targeted sector
gains than a broader geostrategic vision of global economic governance. What accounts
for this downsizing of American ambitions? What is the legacy of these first two years and
what are the perspectives for the second half of the Trump presidency? 
4 To assess Donald Trump’s trade diplomacy, one must first examine the logic behind the
current political revolt against the free trade narrative. Is his criticism against America’s
“bad [trade] deals” merely a rhetoric tool aimed at manipulating his electoral base or is
there any substantive evidence that America has granted overly generous concessions to
its trading partners to preserve the benefits of the multilateral trade system? 
5 To begin with, what might seem like a Trumpian revolution in foreign economic policy is,
from  a  broader  historical  perspective,  anything  but  new.  In  one  form  or  another,
Washington’s emphasis on reciprocal trade has been a recurrent feature of American
trade history from the first diplomatic steps of the early Republic to the ratification of the
1934 Reciprocal  Trade Agreements  Act,  the 1980s  trade conflicts  with Japan and the
debates  surrounding  China’s WTO  membership.  Bearing  in  mind  these  historical
precedents,  this  section  considers  two  explanations  for  Donald  Trump’s  anti-trade
posture. 
6 The first hypothesis puts the logic behind Trump’s mercantilist approach to the test of
trade  economics  by  assessing  whether  the  United  States  might  indeed have  granted
unilateral market access to its trading partners to the detriment of its working class. This
scenario echoes the notion of the “benevolent hegemon” according to which American
foreign economic policy was subservient to its economic interests during the Cold War (as
Senator Paul Tsongas (D, MA) famously said: “The Cold War is over; Japan won.”). One
way to assess the level of reciprocity between the US and its trading partners consists of
comparing the US average tariff level with the rest of the world. Figures and 2 show
average tariff levels in comparative perspective and reveals that the US is indeed one of
the countries with the lowest tariff levels. Among the world’s top four trading powers,
the US has the lowest tariff average (Most-Favored Nation or MFN) for all products as well
as for agricultural goods, and the lowest share of duties above 15% in both categories.
This means that when it comes to MFN tariff barriers, the US economy provides greater
access to other WTO members than the European Union, Japan and China – the latter
having the high tariff levels among all for all categories. 
 
Carte 1: World map of average MFN tariff levels
Source: WTO, 2018
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Figure 1: US tariff levels in comparative perspective 
Top 4 trading powers
Source: WTO, 2018
 
ALL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURE
Simple average* Duties > 15* Simple average* Duties > 15*
USA 3.4 2.8 5.3 5.9
EU 5.1 4.2 10.8 21.4
China 9.8 15.1 15.6 37.2
Japan 4 3.4 13.3 20.8
7 Under other measures,  however,  the United States is not the naïve great power that
Donald Trump portrays it to be. Figure 3 shows that Washington has made much greater
use of its trade defense instruments than its trading partners to seek reciprocity. By the
end of 2017, the US had implemented 324 anti-dumping measures1 as an importer, while
it had faced four times fewer (74) non-tariff measures. The US number of (notified) anti-
dumping measures was almost three times larger than that of the EU, four times that of
China  and  forty-six  times  that  of  Japan.  The  picture  was  similar  with  regard  to
countervailing duties (CVD)2, with Washington showing by far the highest propensity to
use countervailing measures (93 as of the end of December 2017) in great disproportion of
the number of CVD its exporters face (5). 
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Figure 2: US use of non-tariff measures in comparative perspective 
Top 4 trading powers
Source: WTO, 2018
 
ANTI-DUMPING  MEASURES:  final
measures in effect in Dec. 2017
COUNTERVAILING  MEASURES:  final
measures in effect in Dec. 2017
As importer As exporter As importer As exporter
USA 324 74 93 5
EU 117 38 16 3
China 87 603 5 80
Japan 7 59 n/a n/a
8 Thus,  while  the American market  has  been relatively more open to its  WTO trading
partners, it has also been much more aggressive in its use of trade defense instruments, a
mixed picture that contrast with Donald Trump’s rationale that the United States has
been taken advantage of (or “raped” in his own words). Moreover, this brief picture of
reciprocity in international trade only focuses on tariff and non-tariff indicators. With
regard  to  other  provisions  of  trade  agreements  –  from  investment  protection  to
intellectual  property  rules  –  there  is  strong  evidence  that  Washington  has  had
tremendous  influence  on  the  nature  of  the  international  trading  system,  giving  a
competitive edge to many of its high-tech firms, especially in the services sector where
America remains by far the world’s top exporter. 
9 The second interpretation considers  Donald Trump’s  protectionist  retrenchment as  a
strategy to rally a large base of disgruntled white working-class voters. Although trade
has in effect played a limited role in the rise of social inequality and the hollowing out of
the American middle class3, blaming trade and globalization for America’s woes has long
helped to mobilize voters. This was the case when Democrats managed to regain control
of the Congress by blaming Republicans for their support for the Dominican Republican-
Central Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) during the 2006-midterm elections. The fact
that  NAFTA has haunted American politics  for  twenty-five years  is  also a  sign of  its
political  traction.  This  is  a  common  interpretation  of  Trumpism that  is  only  partly
substantiated. Figure 1 shows that the districts that were the most affected by trade (as
measured by allocation of Trade Adjustment Assistance) were also those where support
for Donald Trump was particularly high. 
 
Figure 3: Trade-dislocated workers strongly supported Donald Trump
Source: Brookings, Metropolitan Policy Program, 2017
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10 Yet  despite  common  wisdom,  the  logic  of  Trump’s  economic  nationalism cannot  be
reduced to a popular referendum against trade. For one, several studies have shown that
racial resentment was a greater predictor of electoral support for Trump voters than
economic anxiety. One survey conducted by the Washington Post showed that contrary to
common representations, racial resentment drove economic anxiety, not the opposite4.
These seemingly contrasting perspectives on the linkage between the backlash against
globalization and political support for Donald Trump need not be irreconcilable. In fact,
opposition to trade liberalization and racial attitudes have been central to the right wing
of the Republican Party from the early 1990s debates on NAFTA to the controversies on
the Permanent Normalization of Trade Relations with China. From this perspective, the
central role of protectionism in Donald Trump’s platform might be interpreted as a new
Southern Strategy5,  a form of coded language tapping racial prejudice against Latinos
(NAFTA) and Asians (US-China trade wars), in turn feeding into the economic anxiety of
so-called losers of globalization.
 
From theory to practice
11 These interpretations of Trumpian retrenchment raise two sets of questions for a first
assessment of Trump’s record: 1) Has the doctrine of America First helped rebalance the
world economy to America’s favor? 2) Has it started to address working class anxiety or
merely stoked racial resentment? The NAFTA renegotiations constitute an important case
study to  address  these  questions  and evaluate  the  practice  of  Donald Trump’s  trade
diplomacy.
12 Before focusing on the content of US trade policy, it is important to draw the lessons from
the atypical process under which these renegotiations took place, which culminated with
the  signature  of  the  rebranded  “U.S.-Canada-Mexico  Agreement”  on  September  30th,
2018. When President Trump vowed to use a take-no-prisoner approach to renegotiate
the “worst trade deal ever,” he apparently meant it, as illustrated by the long series of
threats,  poisoned  pills,  insults  and  the  divide-and-conquer  tactics  that  led  to the
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temporary  exclusion of  Canada  from trade  negotiations.  The  first  impression of  one
lobbyist  best  summarizes  America’s  new “trade undiplomacy.”  According to  him,  US
Trade  Representative  and  chief  NAFTA  negotiator  Robert  Lighthizer  began  the
negotiations  “by putting  the  gun and the  knife  on the  table,”  a  posture  that  would
characterize the negotiating style of the US administration until the conclusion of the
talks. 
13 Although the real-estate-magnate-turned-president kept his promises with regard to the
trade  negotiating  process,  the  content  of  the  new trade  deal  is  far  from a  political
revolution. With regard to market access, and despite Trumpian triumphism, there is
little substance to assume that the USMCA brought greater reciprocity to North American
relations. First, however politically unpalatable to Canadians, the concessions granted in
the dairy sector have long been blown out of proportion by the Trump administration.
According to a Brookings study, the estimated gains are expected to represent little more
than 0.2% of total US dairy revenues6. While Canada granted additional concessions to US
exporters  in  the  agricultural  (chicken,  turkey,  eggs  and  wine  markets)  and
pharmaceutical  sectors  (extension of  protection for  biologic  drugs)  and raised  its  de
minimis levels for cross-border shipments, the US tariff side deals in the auto industry
increased quotas for duty-free imports for auto parts and vehicles,  while the USMCA
preserved  the  protection  of  Canadian  cultural  industries.  The  irony  is  that  North
American negotiators largely built upon the chapters that they had negotiated under the
TPP  that  Mexico  and  Canada  had  adopted  without  the  United  States.  In  short,  the
rebranding of NAFTA aside, as far as market access is concerned, there is little evidence
that  the  USMCA  has  “modernized”  or  “rebalanced”  North  American  trade  relations
beyond what the TPP had accomplished. In the words of a trade commentator, NAFTA 2.0
is akin to TPP 0.8.
14 The same conclusion goes for the new rules of origins and labor provisions contained in
the new NAFTA. At first sight, the stricter rules of origins for the auto sector (from 62.5%
under  NAFTA to  75% under  the USMCA)  and new requirements  that  40-45% of  auto
content be made by workers earning at  least  $ 16 (far above Mexican manufacturing
wages) are a creative attempt to bring back segments of the value chain back from Mexico
7. Yet, in effect, many questions remain on the enforcement of these rules and on whether
companies might seek to bypass wage requirements. Indeed, some analysts have argued
that companies might prefer to pay relatively low MFN tariffs (outside of NAFTA) on auto
parts to avoid disrupting their global value chains. As for the USMCA’s labor chapter,
experience shows that enforceability under the dispute settlement mechanism (like all
post-NAFTA trade agreements) does not make it more likely for Washington to press for
workers’ rights protection. Thus, the second, and perhaps most important lesson from
the USMCA is that it will do little to nothing to protect workers’ rights or bring back
manufacturing jobs to the United States;  nor is  it  likely to reduce economic anxiety
among American workers. Of course, the odds were against the Trump administration
from  the  start,  as  NAFTA  had  always  had  a  marginal  effect  on  the  decline  of  US
manufacturing employment in the first place. Yet, in the light of its limited achievements
on behalf of reciprocity and social justice, it is hard to believe that the new NAFTA was
worth  sacrificing  the  geostrategic  benefits  of  TPP,  or  that  its  meager  sectoral  gains
justified straining diplomatic relations with two key American trading partners. After two
years of theatrics, it is time to call the new NAFTA by its real name: a political charade
that, internationally, did considerable diplomatic damage and, domestically, will do little
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for American workers and may yet blow up in the face of its architects if Congress refuses
to ratify it.
15 The third lesson of the USMCA – an apt acronym for political staging and theatrics – is
that  there is  no coopting political  extremism.  This is  a  lesson that  French President
Macron has long learned after failing to rally Donald Trump behind the Paris Agreement
or  the  Iran  nuclear  deal.  In  the  case  of  NAFTA,  neither  Mexican  President  Nieto’s
pragmatic  abnegation,  nor  Prime  Minister  Trudeau’s  clever  outreach  strategy  to
American states and business interests did anything to alter the course of negotiations.
Perhaps the greatest victim of the USMCA was Canada’s “progressive trade strategy” that
sought to make trade policymaking more inclusive and accountable through the addition
of chapters on indigenous rights and trade and gender, all of which were jettisoned under
the dictates of American First. Thus, according to the new Gresham’s law of international
trade politics,  Donald Trump’s  nationalist  undiplomacy has not  only replaced Barack
Obama’s ambitious geostrategic agenda but also aborted Justin Trudeau’s inclusive trade
policy framework. This should be a wake-up call for all partners considering a bilateral
trade agreement with Washington, whether Japan, the EU or the United Kingdom. Despite
the  enthusiasm  around  the  renewed  transatlantic  dialogue,  the  EU’s  “Trade  for  All
Strategy” could be the next victim of US nationalist retrenchment and obliterate all the
Commission’s  efforts  to  shore  up  support  for  a  more  sustainable  form  of  trade
liberalization.  The USMCA shows that  accommodation serves little  purpose.  This  is  a
lesson that China has already drawn.
NOTES
1. According to the WTO, “Dumping is defined in the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of  the  GATT 1994  (The  Anti-Dumping  Agreement)  as  the  introduction  of  a  product  into  the
commerce of another country at less than its normal value. Under Article VI of GATT 1994, and
the  Anti-Dumping  Agreement,  WTO  Members  can  impose  anti-dumping  measures,  if,  after
investigation in accordance with the Agreement, a determination is made (a) that dumping is
occurring, (b) that the domestic industry producing the like product in the importing country is
suffering material injury, and (c) that there is a causal link between the two.”
2. According to the WTO, countervailing duties are unilateral instruments designed to offset the
impact of a country’s subsidies.  It  may be applied by a member after an investigation and a
determination that the criteria defined in the WTO’s Subsidies and Countervailing Measures have
been met. 
3. For  a  discussion  of  the  literature,  see  Jean-Baptiste  Velut  (2017).  « (Dés)  illusions  du
patriotisme économique Du « carnage américain » à « l’Amérique d’abord », Outre-Terre 50 (1),
available at : https://www.cairn.info/revue-outre-terre-2017-1-page-126.htm 
4. For a discussion, see German Lopez, “The past year of research has made it very clear: Trump
won because of racial resentment”, Vox, December 15, 2017, available at: 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/12/15/16781222/trump-racism-economic-anxiety-study 
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5. The Southern Strategy refers to Republicans’ use of racial innuendos and coded language (e.g.
“states’ rights”) to exploit white Southerners’ resentment of the 1960s civil rights reforms and
incite them to defect from the Democratic Party. 
6. Noll, Roger, Litan, Robert E., “Extra milk exports to Canada under Trump’s rebranded NAFTA
will be a drop in the bucket,” October 8, 2018, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2018/10/08/extra-milk-exports-to-canada-under-trumps-rebranded-nafta-will-be-a-drop-
in-the-bucket/
7. Rules  of  origins are the criteria  that  determine where a product is  made.  Under the new
NAFTA, 75 % of a car content has to be produced in North America for it to qualify to preferential
tariffs.
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